Human Rights and International Governance

In the world of international relations theory, schools of thought, to paraphrase General Douglas MacArthur, “never die…they just fade away.” Throughout the 20th century, a number of theories went in and out of fashion, particularly in the United States. The Wilsonian internationalist tradition (named after U.S. President Woodrow Wilson) – which advocated a liberal, rules-based international order dedicated to protecting international peace and stability through multilateralism, collective security and cooperation between states – emerged after the First World War as a response to the old, seemingly bankrupt “balance of power” doctrine that had dominated Europe for centuries, yet had failed to prevent outbreaks of tremendous violence and destruction. But Wilsonian internationalism was never really given a chance to succeed. In the 1920s and 1930s, isolationism – which favoured U.S. withdrawal from the rest of the world’s problem – was by far the most popular doctrine amongst members of Congress who used it as a rationale for opposing U.S. entry into Wilson’s League of Nations. Moving ahead, the Second World War revealed the intellectual flaws with isolationism; the world was simply too connected for the U.S. (or any other power for that matter) to remain unengaged. After WWII, the liberal internationalist tradition was revived, at least in part, through the creation of the UN and other multilateral organizations, but realism emerged as the dominant (although by no means the only) theory of the Cold War period. According to realists, international relations were about power, either the acquisition or maintenance of power. Perhaps the greatest champion of realism to arrive on the scene in the last sixty years was Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State during the Nixon and Ford administrations, whose foreign policy was all about protecting American interests. But realism, despite all of its strengths, is an imperfect theory; it gives too much authority to the nation state and not enough to other actors, and it minimizes the importance of values in the formulation of foreign policy…which leads to the neo-conservative tradition and its supporters.
     The current neo-cons in the United States are an interesting bunch, to say the least. They first emerged as a powerful group during the 1980s when Ronald Reagan was in power. Led by the likes of individuals such as U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and former President of the World Bank Paul Wolfowitz, the neo-cons have rejected liberalism and social democracy but still believe that it is possible to reshape the world in the image of the United States by exporting “American” ideals, specifically democracy, capitalism, liberty and human rights.
     Given this emphasis on values, one would think that liberals would have been fully supportive of the foreign policy priorities of the George W. Bush administration, and, for a time, many liberal academics, both in Canada and the U.S., were indeed seduced by this line of reasoning, and even championed the idea that the United States had a responsibility to act pre-emptively in order to rid the world of a ruthless ruler, and prevent future human rights abuses. But for opponents of this current U.S. administration, neo-conservatism remains a hollow doctrine that is both theoretically flawed and disastrous when put into practice. To opponents, it is a violent ideology, in which war is an acceptable vehicle for bringing about change. Moreover, they suspect that arguments in favour of the promotion of values are little more than covers for more sinister motives. As proof, human rights standards have been sacrificed in the name of the War on Terror, and international human rights law weakened, perhaps irreparably. Of course, a great number of people have died unnecessarily as a result of the military exploits of this current administration.
     In 2008, Americans will elect a new President. One of his or her first orders of business will be to chart a new course for America’s foreign policy. Whether Republican or Democrat, the U.S. public won’t stand for anything that looks like a continuation of the policies of this current administration. For this reason alone, she or he won’t be a neo-con. In fact, she or he may find that there is considerable support for a new wave of isolationism, a longing to retreat from the problems that have emerged over the course of the last eight years.
     Regardless, schools of thought in international relations theory, no matter how tarnished, have a way of coming back in vogue or being reinvented to suit new contexts. Neo-conservatism has been discredited, but it is far from dead. It still has its supporters, particularly among the ranks of the most powerful on the right of the political spectrum. While the next U.S. administration will undoubtedly reject it, future administrations could quite conceivably re-embrace it or a variation of it. Indeed, it may only be a matter of time before we start to hear a new wave of calls to export values through the barrel of a gun.

The opinions expressed are the personal views of the author only, and do not represent the views of any organization or institution with which he is affiliated.