Rebuilding Afghanistan

This issue has been the discussion point in many of my discussion groups in my Transition to Democracy class, and is perhaps beyond the scope of my knowledge to thoroughly clarify but nonetheless I will mention some concise points in terms of the Geopolitical significance of Afghanistan to NATO and the present alliance formation in the east. This will be done in an attempt to clarify and justify NATO’s initial decision to get involved in Afghanistan. This point is crucial for any analysis concerning the present situation of Afghanistan. The basic realist mantra would have us believe that nation states are inherently selfish; they only concern themselves in what is in their own best interest. If we presume this as our underlying criteria, then we must look for special interests that are at stake in Afghanistan for NATO member countries. The essence of this point will require us to ask the following basic question: What has compelled these distant nations (secondary NATO members) to send troops and expend resources in Afghanistan? This discussion will occupy most of our time, however we will briefly focus on the organizational challenges that NATO faces in terms of its capability to readjust to fighting against a robust insurgency.

After the Al Qaeda attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, the NATO invoked article five of the NATO charter which states that an attack against a NATO member is an attack against all NATO members. This compelled NATO members to join in the initial NATO mission against Afghanistan where Al Qaeda was believed to be in existence. The invocation of the article five of NATO did not however compel NATO members to participate in the expanded mission. Nonetheless, they have decided to participate in the NATO expansion. How can this be explained? While the participation of NATO members’ can be justified by organizational commitment, how do we justify the participation of non-NATO members in this NATO led mission? Clearly this trend points to a greater concern that many of these coalition of the willing nations share. To attempt to uncover this concern we must examine the geopolitical significance of Afghanistan not only to the Western bloc including NATO but also Afghanistan’s location as a doorway to Iran and the Central Asian Republics; where the other leading nations of the world including China and Russia share enormous economic and political interests.

NATO’s mission in Afghanistan not only signifies Afghanistan's importance as the frontline state in the war against Al Qaeda, it also signals the renewed importance that Afghanistan has gained in the context of potential future focal points, namely Iran and the Central Asian Republics. We do not want to sound too presumptuous, however suffice to say that Afghanistan’s present geopolitical dominance is not entirely due to its status as the frontline state in the US led war against Al Qaeda. NATO’s role in Afghanistan within this multifaceted context answers the original question that I posed much better. The formation of the coalition of the willing against Al Qaeda was not a mere show of solidarity of the US allies, it was an attempt by the US and its allies to consolidate its foothold at the door step of Central Asia.

The creation of the CSO as a military and economic bloc, bringing into alliance important Central Asian countries as well as Russian and China is clearly an alarming development for NATO and the US in particular. The above assertions about the importance of central Asia is only in the context of the capacity of Central Asia as an energy producing region. Therefore the underlying justification for the alliance creation is over potential untapped natural resources in the region. Given this situation it is only prudent for smaller nations to join into coalitions and be willing partners of leading nations in an attempt to secure their own interests within the interests of the leading nations. While the geopolitical discussion can be extended to discuss the continuing insurgency and how it is being sustained, but without clear empirical evidence, that discussion will have to wait for the future, however we can make an early assumption and ask a question. Can the present insurgency be conceived as a form of retaliation and resistance by the opposition alliance, albeit indirectly?

 What is lost within this geopolitical analysis is the fate of Afghanistan. So far Afghanistan is only important thanks to is geography. What future lies for Afghanistan within this context is difficult to predict. The continuing insurgency is halting much needed reconstruction in the south, and is showing disturbing signs of sophistication in their methods. What is even more disturbing is that the insurgency is expanding as rapidly as the Taliban were once defeated. The Karzia administration seems increasingly out of ideas and desperate; it seems as though the government is unable to reconcile the ulterior motives behind NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan and the insurgency.