Rebuilding Afghanistan

The rise in the violent insurgency, particularly in the Southern  regions of Afghanistan has put renewed pressure on both the Afghan government and NATO to provide security; a prerequisite to reconstruction and development. It follows that both the Afghan government and NATO have adopted mainly military tactics to resolve this growing insurgency. If there is anything we can learn from the history of Afghanistan, it is that militarism in Afghanistan especially being committed by foreigners rarely leads to success. To this end, alternatives to a military option need to be utilized to tame the insurgency in the south and to ensure the success of the NATO mission. The most prudent option is a comprehensive accommodation with tribal leaders, mullahs, former Mujahedeen, and their related Taliban forces. Only this can restore peace in Southern Afghanistan .

Southern Afghanistan , which is primarily occupied by the Pashtuns, has always been a volatile region due to continuous inter-tribal rivalries and chronic underdevelopment. The Pashtuns are a proud people; they have historically been very unreceptive to the presence of foreigners on their land. Their warrior-oriented culture forbids them to submit to any outside authority, explaining the historical power struggle between the central government in Kabul and the tribal areas. Furthermore, the Pashtuns have provided the bulk of the forces of Taliban, and subsequently have had to bear the brunt of violence as a result of NATO's campaign against the Taliban. It is imperative therefore, that the Pashtun culture and grievances are given careful consideration in any initiative targeted at bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan . 

Analyzing the past foreign interventions, it becomes clear that at least historically it has not been able to prevail irrespective of the intervener's conventional superiority. The British and the former USSR were both defeated by opposition primarily inspired by a religious zeal and a warrior culture. The current NATO mission is exhibiting disturbing similarities to the previous foreign endeavors in Afghanistan . These similarities are further realized because of NATO's continued emphasis on militaristic solutions to primarily a political problem. Even with simple observation it appears that the Pashtun tribes of Southern Afghanistan are more concerned about their autonomy, particularly political autonomy, than religious fanaticism; in sharp contrast to the hardcore Taliban and Al Qaeda who are seemingly inspired by religious convictions. Therefore if some sort of a compromise can be reached regarding these concerns of the Pashtun tribes, peace may be easier to achieve.

Canadians situated in Pashtun strongholds need to be at the forefront of the lobbying campaign targeted at the Afghan government to further integrate the Pashtuns in the Afghan political structure. This would require the central government in Kabul to negotiate a settlement with Pashtun tribal leaders about tribal autonomy. This type of settlement would lead to the eventual isolation of hardcore Taliban and Al Qaeda; it is common knowledge that any insurgency needs the support of the population as its main body of man power and for operation bases. A settlement between the government and the tribes in the south will thus strengthen the government and alienate the insurgency.

Let's face it, those who compose Taliban are Afghans, they cannot be eliminated in a militaristic sense, that would entail the complete destruction of the organization and the people who make it up. A possible shift in mental framework is essential: Taliban should no longer be understood in the s ame sense as they were during their ruling years. Taliban today represent a different phenomenon. It is seen particularly by those living in the south of the country as a legitimate body resisting foreign presence and their overall dominating influence in the country. In some instances, the view almost parallels that of the Mujahedeen in their resistance against the soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the Cold War. The view has a strong religious and nationalist sentimental backing and is ultimately a fundamental foundation of the culture with obvious political connotations. Thus, it is not pragmatic or possible to attempt to defeat, such an integral aspect of the culture and rather it must be reconciled through compromise.

It is not in the interest of NATO to fight a war which cannot be won. Most NATO countries would be more then happy to call it mission accomplished in Afghanistan, but for this to happen, they must reconsider their approach to Afghanistan . They must understand the complexities of the task, and recognize that the military option as the only mechanism to fighting the insurgency cannot lead to success. Reconciling with the Pashtun tribes of the south which would also mean negotiating with the moderate element of the Taliban is the way to move forward. This must be done in light of the historical and cultural realities of Afghanistan : which are simple. Afghanistan must be understood as an underdeveloped conservative Muslim country, inhabited by heterogeneous and often divided ethnic groups. Most of the Taliban ideals were not so different from cultural beliefs upheld by the majority of Afghans, therefore expecting a moderate secular order to be raised from such a primordial land is nothing short of foolish.

These efforts would have to be coupled with serious attempts by the Afghan government to eradicate corruption and spread social services to the rural areas. The majority of Afghans live in rural areas, where the government is virtually non-existent, beyond a meager police or military presence and the development campaign has had little or no impact on the lives of many Afghans. This underdevelopment has provided a perfect order for poppy cultivation, and an opportunity for Taliban to further demonize the central government, a popular tool for recruitment of new personnel. In most of rural Afghanistan and more so in the south, unemployment is high, while most people depend on subsistence farming, and in a country ravaged by years of drought the prospects for many look bleak. Naturally the Afghan government does not have the resources to combat these problems; therefore the international community must increase its development aid to Afghanistan .

An alternative to the military option as the only mechanism to fighting the insurgency needs revision preferably in the form of a political alternative. This does not mean completely abandoning the military presence, however in order for the military campaign to succeed it needs to be supported with an extensive political campaign spearheaded by the Afghan government in reconciling with the Pashtun tribes of the south. Such a move may lead to a more extensive and quick military victory for NATO and also strengthen the Afghan government.