e-Dialogue

I agree with Mr Carment that governance is ultimately more important than democracy, but is there not a democratic imperative when working to improve any country abroad? Should we be un-tying aid from demands of elections and transparency to focus more on ‘governance’ outputs? I think that would be a tough sell for the Canadian people – what would happen to the already waning support for the Afghan mission if they cancelled next year’s presidential elections?

“Or rather has democracy become a measuring stick of what is civilized and what is not? (who creates this value ?)… Or is democracy being used as 'rally cry' to justify certain actions, a facade hidding true intents?”

I would say yes on both accounts, Mr Kavadas. That’s in fact what I was suggesting above. In international development, there has to be a pretense of ‘democracy’ to placate those who would not accept tax dollars and soldiers’ lives going to undemocratic societies. I think this is because we identify with and feel comfortable with democracy, and we envision a system emerging rather like ours. Good governance, on the other hand, is something far less salient to the public.

 From a political and social perspective, the concept of good governance plays a leading role in the democratic societies . This concept is an attempt to maintain the right equilibrium between the requirements of Democracy and the requirements of governance .
 In this regard , sacraficing Democracy for the Sake of order (governance) is no longuer a wise solution .
 Canada , as one of the leading democraties , has been taking this consideration into account .In fact, the permanent transformations in Canadian society has been shaping the country to many diversities (cultural,religious,social...).
  A successfull governance policy should consist on what i like to call a "participative governance",a governance wich aims to involve a wide range of citizens in the décision-making process .

          Mhadhebi Houssem(Tunisia)
   mhadhebi@gmail.com

Thanks for the comments. My points are two fold. First, we should not conflate governance and democracy or assume that good governance will automatically follow if we have the trappings of  a democratic system in place. For example our assessment of Ghana with a specific focus on the opinions of parliamentarians (www.carleton.ca/cifp ) showed that while Ghana has in place the mechanisms for practising  democracy on a nation-wide scale there are still major concerns among stakeholders  with respect to corruption and inefficiency. Many parliamentarians felt that they were ineffective as part of the political process. Similar findings were obtained on Guatemala with respect to human rights (both available on site).Service delivery has a place in good governance  and is an important measure of  outcomes. A democracy makes no guarantees that service delivery  to ordinary citizens will be better.

 Second, we have to be careful in assuming that we have extensive leverage. For my money I think we are best positioned to monitor and evaluate democratic and governance processes to ensure that our support is having the intended effects. Canada does not yet enjoy such a capability though our CIFP project has been an effort in that direction. There are a number of caveats that policy makers need to be aware of including false assumptions regarding the relationship between democracy and economic growth and democracy and stability. As we note in the handbook: 

Three basic elements to improving results in democratic development Rémy M. Beauregard, President, Rights & Democracy 

The central challenge of institutions involved in supporting democratic development is without a doubt the achievement, measurement and demonstration of results.   Support for the building of democratic institutions and processes is a long-term undertaking which is difficult to quantify.   Attributing positive changes to specific democracy support initiatives is increasingly complex as the number of actors multiplies and globalization makes it difficult to separate endogenous from exogenous factors that have an impact on the development of democracy.

While seeking to address these challenges, there are a number of ways in the near term to ensure that our democracy support activities achieve greater results and make a positive contribution to the lives of citizens in partner countries.  

First, before engaging in complex political processes in a foreign country, it is essential for the democracy support practitioner to understand local customs, histories and socio-political dynamics.   Movement towards, or away, from democracy depend on a constantly shifting web of interactions among local actors in a country.   Only by understanding these interactions can an external actor hope to identify the processes and institutions that contribute to positive change, and tailor its activities in support of this change.   Identifying and understanding local “agents of change” and the environment in which they operate is key to successful democracy support programming.

Second, a precondition to external assistance is local ownership and engagement.   If, as the report that led to the creation of Rights & Democracy in 1988 notes, “the notion of democracy is the participation of citizens in decision-making that affects their lives”, our support must receive “buy-in” from local actors.   In order to strengthen the capacity of citizens to participate in decision-making, and build the national and local institutions that would permit this, the beneficiary must desire this support and be included as an equal partner in the design, implementation and evaluation of all democracy support initiatives.   Local ownership, at all levels of government and civil society, ensures sustainability, accountability and better results.

Third, our support to democratization must be long term.   In the 20 years since the creation of Rights & Democracy, the primary lesson we have learned is that sustainable improvements in democracy can only be achieved if we are committed to supporting democrats and human rights defenders through good times and bad, over a sustained period of time.   We must look for new ways to develop programs and report on them over the long term, which both satisfies the demands of citizens we are supporting abroad, and answers the questions of citizens at home who are funding our work.

The approach I have outlined is by no means a panacea to generating improved results in democratic development, but rather an essential framework upon which we must build our programs in order to engender the results we seek.

http://www.dd-rd.ca

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L’approche que je viens de décrire ne constitue en aucun cas une panacée permettant de générer de meilleurs résultats en matière de développement démocratique, mais plutôt un cadre essentiel sur lequel nous devons nous appuyer pour élaborer nos programmes, dans le but d’engendrer les résultats auxquels nous aspirons.

Interesting discussion!

David Carment usefully distinguishes between governance and good governance, on the one hand  and  democracy and democratic development on the other. The interplay between both concepts is complex, but that does not imply that we should not try to better understand and evaluate democratic and governance processes and outcomes.

While I agree that "one must always assess governance on a case by case basis" - it is important to acknowledge the insights that can come from large N - statistical analysis. Let me give an example. Research at the World Bank and elswhere have shown that, gloabally, countries with presidential forms of government have higher levels of corruption than those with parliamentary forms, when holding other factors constant. This is an important insight into governance structures and processes and small-N country studies can help explain why this is so.

Steven Langdon (-hello Steven!) reminds us that democracy goes beyond elections, to include accountability mechanisms, active civil soviety, access to information/freedom of expression. All of these factors can be examined cross-nationally to help us discover big patterns - and then at the national level, to help us explain why.

I think Bob Jenkins is wrong - there are a number of countries, in South East Asia, for example, that score low on democratic indices but but high on "good government" (if not "good governance") yardsticks.

Also, if we consider Ghana to be undemocratic because there are "major concerns ...with respect to corruption and inefficiency" and because "parliamentarians felt that they were ineffective as part of the political process", then we would probably conclude that very few countries are truly democratic, for the same reasons.

Bob Johnson asks for examples of good governance in  the absence of democracy. Rather than providing specific  country examples  I would encourage  you and others  to look at our country rankings on the site and the individual country reports as well. What you you will see there are countries that perform  well in some aspects of governance (there are six categories of measurement - including human rights, government efficiency,  human develooment and so on - each with their own sub-set of indicatorsof which democracy is a specific sub-set ) but not others.

You will see that there is great variation of performance along these six dimensions so at any given moment a country may exhibit caharacteristics of good governance while not performing well on democracy scores. (and vice versa). Democracy is a process - while governance speaks to outcomes.

Take for example our assessment of Pakistan - it performs well for example in the category of female parliamentarians but overall its democratic structures are week. This does not prevent it from having a fairly robust economy even though inequality remains an issue. I hope you get the idea.

Another thing we do is track processes over time not just structural data. We also do stakeholder surveys to tap into public opinion (covered more thoroughly in the handbook). These inputs can help determine if there are dynamic chnages within a country at any given moment  and allow for more precise programming with speciifc entry points for policy action.

see: www.carleton.ca/cifp

Shifting focus of democracy assistance programming

Danko Cosic, Director, ProConcept

Current democracy assistance programming is primarily focused on government institutions supplemented lately with efforts to promote private sector economic development.

Maybe the overall value-for-money ofdemocracy support and assistance projects in ‘adolescent democracies’ can be discussed, but it is out of the question that tangible and sustainable results can be achieved only in the long run.

Poor governance in developing countiesoften results in massive leakage of public resources into unnecessary projects, corruption and ineffective service delivery. That undermines efforts to reduce poverty, increase the quality of life,and consolidate democracy.

The two major reasons behind poor governance in developing countries are (1) absence of functional political system resulting in lack of genuine political will to address those issues in a serious manner, and (2) considerable shortcoming of qualified personal working in government institutions.   

In order tomore effectively direct existing efforts, better tailor future programming, and decrease the overall program costsin the situation of declining available funding,it is crucial to shift focus of democracy assistance from “institutions” to “individuals” and from “process” to “skills”.

Strengthening professional skills and competences ofindividuals working in government institutions would increase accountability of political processes, and consequently create more effective state institutions. Targeting individuals instead of institutions would build-up ownership over the process, contribute to the sustainability of results, and increase the overall value-for-money ofdemocracy assistance programming.

Danko Cosic's comments that poorly applied governance is a consequence of "considerable shortcomings of qualified personnel working in government institutions" and results in "massive leakage of public resources" are totally valid.  I put these points across in my Nov. 4 comments and proposals, but probably not quite as succinctly.

I am in full agreement with his proposal to shift the focus from institutions to individuals and from  process to skill.  His last paragraph sums things up very well and I do hope that his proposal will result in further discussion.

I will make just one further point.  This change of focus is even more desperately needed to promote economic development in the private sector, because that is where meaningful jobs are created.  Those jobs are the primary driver to reduction in poverty and to improvement in the quality of life.

The need to promote economic development in the private sector, mentioned by Frederick Sneider, is indeed very important in the context of democracy assistance. Strong private sector creates demand for transparency and accountability of governing processes. In other words, private sector economic development programming generates additional pressure and new operating environment for governments in developing countries.

In order to more effectively direct existing efforts, better tailor future programming, and decrease the overall program costs in the situation of declining available funding, it is crucial to shift focus of democracy assistance from “institutions” to “individuals” and from “process” to “skills”.

Having experimented with this very thing while dealing with poverty here in Canada, the results were very positive.  Giving the attention on an individual level requires a more in-depth relationship than dealing with an institutional interface.  That connection is crucial in establishing a desire to 'improve'.  With very little funds but heavy on information and moral support individuals gained skill sets and attitude to engage effectively within the society and themselves improving their own situation.  With each individual I dealt with there was a sense of gaining an active 'right' of being part of society but more so the 'right' to contribute in social discourse to improve society.  I do not know if this would be the result else where given societal perspective differences.

On the individual level are we not talking about a form of education be it self generated or assisted - I use education in its broadest sense here.

I find this discussion most interesting and timely and the distiction made on democracy and democratic development extremely useful. I would like to link these concepts and distinctions to the issue of improve results, and ask good governance or democratic governance for what results? What results are expected as an outcome of good governance what are those expected of democratic governance? Allow me to share few thoughts:

I am having a hard time figuring out how education relates directlky to democratic processes.  The same logic was applied in the conflict prevention field - eg we if wimply educate people then their propensity to be less conflictual will decline But this is misplaced I think. and does not necessarily produce results. We need dedicated, targetted programmes.

 I am more interested in results and  directly measureable outccomes. Education may well be  an asnwer but it must be tied specifically to democracy and governance processes.  How to measure and evaluate corruption is a good place to start education. Human rights another. Finally education for parliamentarians might be worthwhile.

I agree with Steven Langdon’s remark on people shifting and the risk of wasted efforts when talking about focusing democracy assistance programming on individuals. But this risk, to the certain extend, is also present in the ‘institution’ approach, because ‘institutions’ are made of people and ‘processes’ are run by people.

However, when leaving the institutions, many people are shifting within the governing system, for instance from parliament to government. By transferring expertise to another institution, they will expend the indirect outputs, and therefore increase the overall outcomes of democracy assistance, rather then reducing them. The argument is still valid if these people shift to the private sector, where strong private sector generates additional pressure and new operating environment for good governance.

There are two groups of people working in the government institutions – ‘political appointees’ and ‘full time professionals’ (for instance parliamentary staff). While the probability for ‘politicians’  to shifting within the governing system is high, experience is showing that probability for ‘professionals’ to leave is rather reduced. As such, programming can target not only for example MPs, but also parliamentary staff who assist MPs, Committees, and the Parliament as a whole. Tailoring programming so to target ‘politicians’ together with ‘professionals’, can contribute at overcoming the risk of “politicians” leaving institutions and sustain the direct outputs of democracy assistance.

Finally, I fully agree with Steven that the “educational efforts need to be part of an institution-based strategy”, while the institution-based strategy is targeting ‘individuals’ and is focused on ‘skills development’ in order to improve the overall ‘institution’ performance and overall governing ‘processes’.