Disarming Conflict

The important and necessary international fuss over Iran’s pursuit of uranium enrichment technology is rooted in the dangerous reality that the same knowledge and skill that go into the partial enrichment of uranium (to produce low enriched uranium) for use as fuel for civilian nuclear power rectors can also be used for further enrichment and thus for producing highly enriched uranium that can be used to build nuclear bombs.

Accordingly, there is urgent interest in non-proliferation circles in confining enrichment technology to a very few, and very closely inspected, hands. The Bush Administration has advocated a straight forward policy of prohibiting the transfer of enrichment technologies and equipment[i] to any country that does not already possess a fully mature enrichment capability,[ii] but more recently has eased its position precisely to accommodate Canada’s interests.[iii]

Because Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) affirms the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, any proposal to restrict access to the production reactor fuel must realistically be linked to proposals for assured supply of fuel – in other words, the idea is to ask states to permanently forego the pursuit of a fuel production capability (which is closely linked to a bomb production capability) in return for guaranteed access to fuel that is produced under multilateral supervision or control.

In 2005 Canada joined a number of other countries at the NPT Review Conference to argue that “a non-discriminatory approach” to assuring access to nuclear fuel would, in addition to serving shared non-proliferation objectives, “provide the benefits of cost effectiveness and economies of scale for whole regions, for smaller countries or for those with limited resources.”[iv]

A preparatory meeting for the 2010 NPT review conference concludes today in Geneva, and this time Canada’s support for multilateral controls over proliferation-sensitive technologies like uranium enrichment has shifted – still supporting severe restrictions and multilateral controls, but inserting some wiggle room to allow for Canada to undertake enrichment in the future. Thus, restrictions on fuel cycle technologies, says Canada, “should be based on criteria that recognize exemplary non-proliferation credentials and legitimate economic or fuel-cycle justification for preserving future uranium processing options.”[v]

In other words, while the objective is still to restrict the technology and develop multilateral mechanism for assured access, there is now an explicit plea for allowing some exceptions. That obviously begs the question of how to determine who qualifies for an exception. Canada says it should only be for states like Canada, that is, those with “exemplary non-proliferation credentials” and with “legitimate” justification for “preserving future uranium processing options.”

But these kinds of criteria only raise further questions. What is the difference between a state fully in compliance with its non-proliferation obligations and one with “exemplary non-proliferation credentials?”

In reality there is no difference, and that means Canada is now essentially arguing against a comprehensive ban on the further spread of enrichment technology. Instead, Ottawa’s argument has shifted to support a global arrangement that would allow states with “exemplary non-proliferation credentials” – meaning in reality states in full compliance with their non-proliferation obligations – to pursue enrichment options. That is potentially a very long list of exempted states.

Canada could credibly argue that while it supports moves toward multilateral control of proliferation sensitive fuel cycle technologies, it is reluctant to simply accept the assumption that only those states that now possess mature versions of these technologies will be permitted to manufacture reactor fuel in the future. If the technology is to be severely restricted, what is the rationale for picking this point in time to freeze in the haves and have nots of nuclear fuel production?

Ottawa could try to make a case for geographic re-distribution (e.g. closing some of the European facilities and permitting facilities in Latin America (e.g. Brazil) and Africa (e.g. South Africa) – both of which have some ambitions towards those ends. Canada could make the case that countries rich in uranium should also be permitted to upgrade it from raw material to actual fuel – but what is not credible for a multilaterally controlled nuclear fuel system is to argue that states in exemplary compliance with non-proliferation rules (presumably a status that all states should aspire to) earns you exemptions from some of those rules.

Iran, for example, does not yet share Canada’s exemplary non-proliferation credentials, but it could move fairly quickly to full compliance with its non-proliferation obligations, including implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol to facilitate more intrusive inspections – and according to the line of argument advanced by Canada, Iran would then have a legitimate claim to being one of the manufacturers of multilaterally controlled fuels. Perhaps Iran could be a regional producer, but so could many others if the Canadian formulation were to be accepted.

Canada’s first obligation, as a state with exemplary non-proliferation credentials, is to promote and support strict multilateral controls to prevent the spread of proliferation sensitive fuel cycle technologies. Secondarily, it can try to make the case for Canada as one site for multilaterally-controlled enrichment, but the way to do that is not to propose a vague general standard that essentially says an exemplary non-proliferation record entitles a state to compromise the multilateral interest in favor of the national interest.