Disarming Conflict

John Manley has recently been at pains to point out that when his Panel frankly concluded that “popular confidence in the capacity of ISAF or Afghan authorities to protect the security of citizens has declined between 2005 and 2007” (p. 15) it was not intending Canadians to conclude that this failure represents largely a military challenge. “We need a new and different approach to our mission in Afghanistan, he wrote in the Globe and Mail. “In particular, there must be greater emphasis on diplomacy, reconstruction, development and building Afghan institutions of governance.”[i] 

It is an important reminder, but both the panel and the Parliamentary resolution that reshaped and extended the mission have failed to face the core diplomatic challenge – that is, a renewed peace and reconciliation effort. The Panel did say (p. 17) that “Canada should contribute to Afghanistan’s better governance by facilitating, where possible, the difficult process of reconciliation,” but it didn’t mean by that a broad comprehensive peace process. Rather, it meant “a negotiated coming-to-terms between the present Afghan political leadership and some adherents of the former Taliban regime who renounce terror and repression and adopt the norms and practices of democracy” (p.17). In other words, it proposed an amnesty program of the kind the Afghan government has already been promoting; an approach that in itself makes sense but that falls well short of a comprehensive political process designed to bring all Afghans together.

The Parliamentary motion took “note that the ultimate aim of Canadian policy is to leave Afghanistan to Afghans, in a country that is better governed, more peaceful and more secure and to create the necessary space and conditions to allow the Afghans themselves to achieve a political solution to the conflict.” But then the resolution went on to say that achieving this aim would require training and equipment support for what it called the “four pillars” of Afghanistan’s security apparatus – namely, “the army, the police, the judicial system and the correctional system.”

The need for a credible political process to “achieve a political solution to the conflict” did not make it into Parliament’s frame of reference. Even though the need for such a process is in fact recognized in many other quarters, notably in the 2007 UN Secretary-General’s report (p. 3, para 9): “If the trends of the past two years [deteriorating security] are to be reversed … a more comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy will be needed to reinforce political outreach to disaffected groups….” The Secretary-General does not discount the need for military action to protect communities from insurgent attacks, but points out that “different goals and movements within the insurgency present opportunities for political outreach and inclusion that must be seized” (p. 17, para 75).

In his March 2008 report, the Secretary-General also refers to the need for p olitical outreach – meaning both “day-to-day efforts by UNAMA regional and provincial offices to link Afghan communities to their Government and to promote the implementation of the Compact,” as well as “recognition that there are actors within Afghanistan who are opposing the Government but whose differences can be reconciled within the framework of the Constitution” (p. 16, para 64.b.) He emphasizes that promoting reconciliation requires the approval of the Government.

In some contexts the need for reconciliation is sometimes characterized by the shorthand phrase, “negotiating with the Taliban,” but that should obviously not be taken as promoting acquiescence to Taliban demands and acceptance of a return to extreme human rights violations. In fact, it isn’t really a call for negotiating with the Taliban as such, but rather the call for a comprehensive peace process to address the fundamental conflicts and grievances that remain unaddressed in Afghan society. The point, for example, is to pursue ways of building a relationship of trust between the southern Pashtuns and the rest of the country, most certainly in the context of respect for fundamental rights. While that is a prominently discussed fissure in Afghan society, there are many others in a society that has yet to thoroughly and comprehensively address the conflicts that fuelled the civil war that predated the October 2001 US-led invasion and are still fuelling the insurgency.

A recent report by the CCIC’s Surendrini Wijeyaratne[ii]provides an excellent account of the complexities of pursuing a political resolution to the Afghanistan conflict, yet it argues that it is an urgent requirement that current and disconnected efforts at peacemaking must build toward a coordinated and shared pursuit of long-term peace and reconciliation.

The Manley Panel (p. 12) acknowledged the current Afghanistan conflict as “a continuation of almost three decades of war involving many of the same players, not all of which are Taliban, resulting in a combination of anti-government insurgents and self-interested ‘spoilers’ who, for reasons of personal power or economic interests, have no desire to see rule of law or central authority spread.” But the Panel was entirely silent on how to address this longstanding political conflict.

The text of the report (p. 17) did make an important statement about the need for reconciliation: “Eventually, achieving a genuine and stable peace in Afghanistan will necessitate a more thoroughgoing political and social reconciliation among Afghans themselves—citizens who have been divided for generations on differences of tribal, regional and political identity.” Unfortunately, this observation did not drive any of the recommendations and did not find its way into the Afghanistan Motion passed in Parliament.

Despite the omission, diplomatic efforts toward a comprehensive peace process and to address the grievances and regional conditions that continue to drive the insurgency are bound to emerge in the coming months and years – Canada should be driving this trend.

References

Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan [The Manley Panel]. 2008. Final report.http://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/report-eng.html.

Parliamentary Resolution on Afghanistan, tabled February 21, 2008, and approved March 13, 2008.

UN Security Council. 2007. The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security. Report of the Secretary-General. September 21. A/62/345–S/2007/555.http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.htm.g

UN Security Council. 2008. The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security. Report of the Secretary-General. March 8. A/62/722S/2008/159.http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/255/80/PDF/N0825580.pdf?OpenElement