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Oxford Workshop on Leadership, Peacebuilding and Corruption, University of Oxford-22/23 March 2007 (Paper 4)

Summary of a paper written by Mark Philip on corruption and peace-building

The author commences by outlining a thorough definition of corruption.   Eloquently stated, political corruption occurs where a public official (A), acting for personal gain, violates the norms of public office and harms the interests of the public (B), to benefit a third party (C), who then rewards A for access to goods or services which C would not otherwise obtain.   He argues that corruption cheats human beings of their legitimate expectations from the representative government, in terms of political accountability and transparency, in both state institutions and bureaucratic machinery, to deliver basic services and jobs.   Corruption, in effect, leads to increased inequalities among income groups while simultaneously undermining economic growth and hampering attempts to direct much-needed economic assistance to the most vulnerable segments of the population.

Mark goes further to state that although corruption is a multifaceted concept, there is a common thread that can be found in all types of corruption.   They all violate rules and norms concerning the execution of the role of office and recognition of certain formal responsibilities have been undermined in the absence of any constraints on self-interested behaviour.

In the murky world of complacency and self-interested practices that include siphoning of state resources and misappropriation of public funds, scholars have often sought to make clear some of the issues of what constitutes corruption, as a way of identifying and addressing its root causes.    It has often been said that the issue of corruption is often regarded as a highly relative and especially difficult concept to define.   What constitutes corruptive behaviour in one context can be refuted and dismissed as a legitimate practice in yet another context.   Ultimately, judging an act as corrupt basically comes down to the question of how policy-makers and government leaders adhere to the standards and norms of legitimacy.

However, contrary to popular perception, Mark argues that it is erroneous to assume that only criminals and rogues engage in corruptive behaviour.    Rather, corruption engulfs ordinary citizens who then find themselves stuck in a web of extensive corruption and a culture of reciprocity, networks and favours, usually endemic in post-conflict societies where institutions and public order is weak and anarchic.   Moreover, he points out that in this divided community, with many different and often selfish interests perpetuated by past histories of civil turmoil, corruption is most rife.

Even relief agencies find themselves with a dilemma as to how to operate constructively in a climate of entrenched corruption.   Mark points out those relief agencies, such as the Red Cross, have been rumoured to write off 20% of their funding in post-conflict areas, to corruption, on the grounds that humanitarian goals take precedence over anti-corruption efforts.   Thus, the issue of adhering to the rule of law and norms often appears to be unsustainable and furthermore, difficult to uphold in the midst of life and death situations.   Aid agencies have to come to grips with the issue of how they should implement relief aid operations in a post-conflict setting; one that focuses on a clean aid delivery system or one that delivers aid most effectively.

Not only is corruption difficult to identify at times, but it is also increasingly intricate to quantify and its many intricacies are understated.   Mark argues that there no uniformity in how corruption is structured.   Rather, it is thought that there are a number of different types and dimensions of corruption.   He points to the recent work on state capture, which distinguishes between state capture, where the procedures and laws of the state are the result of corrupt influences; and administrative corruption where officials misuse their office solely for personal gain.   Mark goes on to say that policy-makers should also make the point of distinguishing between the types of institutions that can be captured, which include: the occupying forces; the agents who undertake the capture, comprising of interest groups, local warlords, sections of the state services and bureaucracy; and the types of benefits provided to public officials in the process of capture, that include equity stakes, protection from violence; or the types of institutions that can be captures, which include the judiciary, legislature and independent regulatory agencies.

Moreover, in his paper Mark further points to the importance of highlighting how corruption can inevitably occur across state boundaries, by multinational corporations and investors, or by the activities of foreign governments and state officials.   Although, the most identifiable trace of corruptive behaviour is a monetary transaction, corruption can be manifested in a number of other situations, particularly extensive favouritism in the distribution of resources or positions of authority and protection from violent retribution.  

In terms of the operating environment, the author stresses that corruption can only take place within a semblance of the rule of law and norms.   Indeed, corruption is a result of manipulation of the political order of states.   It is further fuelled with the normative order of peace building and the establishment of a political order that is established in part to bring an end to conflicts, while paving the way for the distribution of goods and services, particularly in post-conflict or fragile states.  

However, this is not to say that corruption should be ignored.   Mark argues that the battle against corruption should be fought from a strategic perspective.   Its first aim is to identify who, in government and state institutions, to hold accountable when corruptive behaviour is perceived to be out of control.   Secondly, find way on how to promote good social and corporate responsibility among foreign agents, principally governments, multinational corporations, contractors, and relief agencies.   Thirdly, to identify which groups use power to augment their control and which distribute their benefits throughout the community.   Perhaps the most important lesson in any anti-corruption drive is to prioritize the qualitative nature of corruption, rather than solely prioritizing its quantitative aspect.   Establishing a system with high personal security, powered by strong state institutions, with transparent and responsive judiciary and police force and a directed political will and accountability from the executive national government, to the provisional and local governments, offers the best hope for successfully containing corruption.  

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