Americas
an examination of current affairs in the hemisphere
Chavez Flip-Flops, but Nothing Really Changes
Over the last few weeks, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
has had everybody guessing. In several announcements, he has
modified previous positions, changed courses of action, and
rectified policies.
All of this has left the international media wondering. "Weak or wise" asks the BBC. "Master tactician or failing bungler?" headlines the Economist.
Beyond Chavez's reasons for his turnarounds, what matters is the real impact these might have, both on Venezuelan domestic politics and in the international arena.
Internationally, Chavez's call to the Colombian guerrillas, FARC, to free their hostages and bring their guerrilla warfare to an end has been the most notorious position shift. Only a few months ago he was urging the world to de-list the FARC as terrorists and recognize them as an "insurgent force."
The change of heart could be explained by the international backlash from that call, the prospects of documents showing his links to the FARC being exposed, or by the predicaments of the increasingly isolated, divided and weakened FARC.
The Colombian government—as well as the French—welcomed the new call. If anyone had any ascendancy over the FARC to induce them to release hostages, it would be Chavez.
The FARC replied that freeing the "prisoners" they hold has always been their objective, provided, that is, the government releases 500 guerrillas from Colombian jails. Initial expectations for unilateral releases are waning and some analysts believe they might only come as deserters from the guerrillas use them as leverage for exile, avoiding prosecution.
On the domestic front, Chavez has found his positions weakened by a combination of factors. Inflation, scarcities of basic products, crime rates, and corruption are being felt by everyone, Chavistas and anti-Chavistas alike, and have become unmanageable by the political discourse alone.
The inefficiency of the government to deliver on basic needs has rendered the promises empty. Extreme measures of state control and the radicalization of the political process, implemented behind the veil of an illusion of bonanza, are now being confronted with increased mobilization of social sectors.
Chavez has the authority—conferred upon him by the National Assembly—to legislate by decree. Thus he passed a new Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Law, only to repeal it a couple of weeks later.The law explicitly forced every citizen to co-operate with state agencies or face imprisonment. In Venezuelan society—with its many unwritten codes—there is no behaviour more reprehensible than snitching; to be a "sapo" (a toad) or an informant is despicable and unforgivable. Venezuelans reacted in outraged unison against the "sapo" law.
Despite the legislation being repealed, chances are the state policing agencies will not reverse their current practices. The regime has taken considerable steps in 10 years towards the intimidation and harassment of dissenters, and these will continue "de facto" albeit not "de jure."
Another "rectification" was the decision not to go ahead—for now—with the proposed changes to the education curricula for primary and secondary education. The changes would have seen Venezuelan kids receiving a distorted interpretation of the country's history, a highly ideological version of contemporary issues, the imposition of militaristic practices, and the glorification of Chavez's persona. Civil society, parents and teachers mobilized against the proposal to the point of preventing its immediate implementation.
But much has changed in Venezuela already, and will take generations to reverse. The wider societal impact of turning "merit" into a bad word, by privileging party loyalty over technical skills or knowledge, is hard to tally. The effects of innumerable government handouts, disguised as scholarships, bursaries, subsidies, and other euphemisms, have contributed to cementing a parasitic culture. People don't need to work, study, produce, or have any initiative to receive direct buyouts, provided they attend official demonstrations, hang up the propaganda, register in the official party and vote.
This picture is also true of the new elite class, the Bolivarian-bourgeoisie, which has amassed obscene fortunes through contracting with the government, corruption and favours. In a country where—with some notable exceptions—the entrepreneurial class has somehow always lived under the protection of the state, the last 10 years have seen this dependence increase. An independent private sector has been all but crushed under governmental controls as the oil revenues pay for an artificial economy reliant on imports, resulting in the dismantling of the production capacity of the local industry. So when, in yet another shift, Chavez convoked some 500 local and foreign entrepreneurs last week and announced his "new economic measures," these have to be seen through this prism.
The elimination of a tax on financial transactions is, of course, welcomed, even if it only represents acknowledgment of how absurd it was in the first place. The elimination of bureaucratic obstacles to access to foreign currency, up to $50,000 (US), for local businesses in need of imported supplies is also welcomed, yet it does little to revert the exchange controls or the artificially over-valued local currency that kill any possibility of international competitiveness.
The creation of a $1-billion (US) fund for the government to invest in joint initiatives in chosen sectors only perpetuates the discretionary spending and the paybacks for political favours.
Will these measures, reactivate local private production, create jobs and help curb inflation? Probably not, but for Chavez it widens the circle of those subsidized by his government. The extension of the unsustainable model that has brought him thus far might yet prevent his regime's defeat in the governors' and mayors' elections in November.
Chavez's turnarounds can be perceived as big or small, or as the result of calculated strategy or improvisations, but the fact remains that very little will change as a result. The impacts of a decade in power have already left an international and domestic imprint that withstands circumstantial posturing.
All of this has left the international media wondering. "Weak or wise" asks the BBC. "Master tactician or failing bungler?" headlines the Economist.
Beyond Chavez's reasons for his turnarounds, what matters is the real impact these might have, both on Venezuelan domestic politics and in the international arena.
Internationally, Chavez's call to the Colombian guerrillas, FARC, to free their hostages and bring their guerrilla warfare to an end has been the most notorious position shift. Only a few months ago he was urging the world to de-list the FARC as terrorists and recognize them as an "insurgent force."
The change of heart could be explained by the international backlash from that call, the prospects of documents showing his links to the FARC being exposed, or by the predicaments of the increasingly isolated, divided and weakened FARC.
The Colombian government—as well as the French—welcomed the new call. If anyone had any ascendancy over the FARC to induce them to release hostages, it would be Chavez.
The FARC replied that freeing the "prisoners" they hold has always been their objective, provided, that is, the government releases 500 guerrillas from Colombian jails. Initial expectations for unilateral releases are waning and some analysts believe they might only come as deserters from the guerrillas use them as leverage for exile, avoiding prosecution.
On the domestic front, Chavez has found his positions weakened by a combination of factors. Inflation, scarcities of basic products, crime rates, and corruption are being felt by everyone, Chavistas and anti-Chavistas alike, and have become unmanageable by the political discourse alone.
The inefficiency of the government to deliver on basic needs has rendered the promises empty. Extreme measures of state control and the radicalization of the political process, implemented behind the veil of an illusion of bonanza, are now being confronted with increased mobilization of social sectors.
Chavez has the authority—conferred upon him by the National Assembly—to legislate by decree. Thus he passed a new Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Law, only to repeal it a couple of weeks later.The law explicitly forced every citizen to co-operate with state agencies or face imprisonment. In Venezuelan society—with its many unwritten codes—there is no behaviour more reprehensible than snitching; to be a "sapo" (a toad) or an informant is despicable and unforgivable. Venezuelans reacted in outraged unison against the "sapo" law.
Despite the legislation being repealed, chances are the state policing agencies will not reverse their current practices. The regime has taken considerable steps in 10 years towards the intimidation and harassment of dissenters, and these will continue "de facto" albeit not "de jure."
Another "rectification" was the decision not to go ahead—for now—with the proposed changes to the education curricula for primary and secondary education. The changes would have seen Venezuelan kids receiving a distorted interpretation of the country's history, a highly ideological version of contemporary issues, the imposition of militaristic practices, and the glorification of Chavez's persona. Civil society, parents and teachers mobilized against the proposal to the point of preventing its immediate implementation.
But much has changed in Venezuela already, and will take generations to reverse. The wider societal impact of turning "merit" into a bad word, by privileging party loyalty over technical skills or knowledge, is hard to tally. The effects of innumerable government handouts, disguised as scholarships, bursaries, subsidies, and other euphemisms, have contributed to cementing a parasitic culture. People don't need to work, study, produce, or have any initiative to receive direct buyouts, provided they attend official demonstrations, hang up the propaganda, register in the official party and vote.
This picture is also true of the new elite class, the Bolivarian-bourgeoisie, which has amassed obscene fortunes through contracting with the government, corruption and favours. In a country where—with some notable exceptions—the entrepreneurial class has somehow always lived under the protection of the state, the last 10 years have seen this dependence increase. An independent private sector has been all but crushed under governmental controls as the oil revenues pay for an artificial economy reliant on imports, resulting in the dismantling of the production capacity of the local industry. So when, in yet another shift, Chavez convoked some 500 local and foreign entrepreneurs last week and announced his "new economic measures," these have to be seen through this prism.
The elimination of a tax on financial transactions is, of course, welcomed, even if it only represents acknowledgment of how absurd it was in the first place. The elimination of bureaucratic obstacles to access to foreign currency, up to $50,000 (US), for local businesses in need of imported supplies is also welcomed, yet it does little to revert the exchange controls or the artificially over-valued local currency that kill any possibility of international competitiveness.
The creation of a $1-billion (US) fund for the government to invest in joint initiatives in chosen sectors only perpetuates the discretionary spending and the paybacks for political favours.
Will these measures, reactivate local private production, create jobs and help curb inflation? Probably not, but for Chavez it widens the circle of those subsidized by his government. The extension of the unsustainable model that has brought him thus far might yet prevent his regime's defeat in the governors' and mayors' elections in November.
Chavez's turnarounds can be perceived as big or small, or as the result of calculated strategy or improvisations, but the fact remains that very little will change as a result. The impacts of a decade in power have already left an international and domestic imprint that withstands circumstantial posturing.
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