Americas
an examination of current affairs in the hemisphere
Bolivia: Morales's Undoing is His Own Doing
During his visit to the United Nations in New York earlier
this month, Bolivian President Evo Morales told the BBC that the
cause of the problems in his country was that the opposition could
not accept an indigenous president.
This is an incomplete analysis at best. The crisis the country is in is a direct result of the government's inability to deal with the impoverished nation's pressing challenges. The ethnic card is no more than an excuse.
Mr. Morales was elected amid turbulent times for Bolivia. The successive ousting of presidents Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa was the result of constant mobilizations and road blockades paralyzing the economy.
This downward spiral into chaos was orchestrated by many organizations and capitalized upon by Mr. Morales's Movement Towards Socialism (MAS). The desire for stability and a return to some sense of normalcy prevailed amongst vast sectors of the population, creating a circumstantial majority that elected him as president. The world celebrated the apparent triumph of democracy that handed the indigenous leader an opportunity to contribute to ending centuries of inequalities and injustices. Hope was short-lived.
Sadly enough, with Morales's democratic culture limited to his vertical autocratic leadership in the peasant and labour unions' environment, it soon became apparent that demands for openness and dialogue would go unanswered.
Mobilizing demonstrations that could paralyse a country proved much easier than governing it. Whenever his government has faced opposition, the first reaction has consistently been to mobilize supporters to attack the critics, change or ignore the rules, and arbitrarily try to impose decisions.
Following Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's agenda, Morales convoked a Constitutional Assembly to draft a new constitution.
However, in Assembly elections, his supporters obtained just over 50 per cent of the vote, not the two-thirds majority required for passing the proposed new text. The Constitutional Assembly was not able to reach agreement on any of the discussions, and deadline after deadline went by. The government took its intransigence one step forward and changed the rules, proceeding to approve unilaterally, by simple majority, a proposed constitution that they will eventually submit to a referendum.
Morales proceeded to nationalize the country's hydrocarbons, a decision that could have been for Bolivia's benefit, had it not been carried out in an improvised and hasty manner.
In the process, Morales alienated the country's partners and neighbours, its main clients and investors, and had no choice but to backtrack and renegotiate when faced with the realization of his government's incapacity to run the industry. The managerial and technical challenges, compounded with the capital and investment needs, and the planning and commercialization demands, proved insurmountable.
The damage was already done, as the credibility of the government was seriously impaired.
Bolivian foreign policy under Morales has been entirely dependent on the Havana-Caracas dictums. Innumerable opportunities for support and co-operation, attracting new investments, and cementing new partnerships for development have been botched by falling into the "anti-imperialist" rhetoric of Hugo Chavez.
The goodwill expressed by so many who wished to see Morales succeed has been dampened by unnecessary confrontational stances. Morales's handling of the 4th Europe-Latin America and the Caribbean Summit in Vienna, Austria, on May 2006, where he snubbed European co-operation in favour of radical posturing at a parallel summit, illustrates the point.
Be that as it may, it is in the domestic front where the combined policy failures and confrontational responses to dissent have had a more direct impact. Bolivia is in crisis. A country already divided along many lines has seen the divisions exacerbated by the current government. A deep and long expression of the country's regional imbalances, the autonomic aspiration of four departments (provinces) is now threatening with what the Organization of American States' envoy, Dante Caputo, warned could be a violence outbreak of unpredictable consequences.
On May 4, the Department of Santa Cruz is holding a referendum on autonomy. Three other departments plan to follow suit. It is no coincidence that these are the richer provinces, and strongholds of the opposition. The National Electoral Court (CNE) ruled that the referendums are illegal, ratifying a decision by Congress (taken in the absence of the opposition members who were locked out by Morales's supporters). Many mediation initiatives have failed thus far. The Church, Brazil, and the OAS have tried unsuccessfully to bring the government and the prefects (governors) of the four provinces to the negotiating table.
In a reversal of his initial position, the Bolivian foreign minister appealed to the OAS to mediate, and new attempts by the multilateral organization will take place this week, with the hope of reaching a compromise between the parties before the Sunday referendum.
The Permanent Council of the OAS, where the national governments of 34 countries of the hemisphere are represented, expressed last Saturday its support for the government of Bolivia, calling for the preservation of democracy and of the territorial integrity of the country.
A violent conflict in Bolivia would undoubtedly have repercussions throughout the region, and the biggest threats could come from an internationalization of the conflict through the intervention of Venezuela.
During an emergency presidential summit of the Bolivarian Alternative, ALBA, last week, Chavez warned that he would come in support of Morales. The opposition to Morales has forcibly denounced Venezuela's meddling in Bolivia's internal affairs. Military co-operation is but one of many joint initiatives that has included direct handouts of Venezuelan cheques to the ideologically akin municipal governments and "advisors" in all spheres of government.
Bolivia has shown great resilience in many difficult passages of its troubled history. Nobody would like to see the Andean nation plunge into a civil war that could tear it into pieces.
Yet, it should be the Bolivians, all Bolivians, who decide their fate. Let's hope it is through democratic and peaceful means, and that Morales understands that dissent is an essential component of democracy.
Although so many divisive issues imbue Bolivia's predicaments, and ethnicity is indeed one of them, Morales's undoing is thus far his own doing.
This is an incomplete analysis at best. The crisis the country is in is a direct result of the government's inability to deal with the impoverished nation's pressing challenges. The ethnic card is no more than an excuse.
Mr. Morales was elected amid turbulent times for Bolivia. The successive ousting of presidents Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa was the result of constant mobilizations and road blockades paralyzing the economy.
This downward spiral into chaos was orchestrated by many organizations and capitalized upon by Mr. Morales's Movement Towards Socialism (MAS). The desire for stability and a return to some sense of normalcy prevailed amongst vast sectors of the population, creating a circumstantial majority that elected him as president. The world celebrated the apparent triumph of democracy that handed the indigenous leader an opportunity to contribute to ending centuries of inequalities and injustices. Hope was short-lived.
Sadly enough, with Morales's democratic culture limited to his vertical autocratic leadership in the peasant and labour unions' environment, it soon became apparent that demands for openness and dialogue would go unanswered.
Mobilizing demonstrations that could paralyse a country proved much easier than governing it. Whenever his government has faced opposition, the first reaction has consistently been to mobilize supporters to attack the critics, change or ignore the rules, and arbitrarily try to impose decisions.
Following Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's agenda, Morales convoked a Constitutional Assembly to draft a new constitution.
However, in Assembly elections, his supporters obtained just over 50 per cent of the vote, not the two-thirds majority required for passing the proposed new text. The Constitutional Assembly was not able to reach agreement on any of the discussions, and deadline after deadline went by. The government took its intransigence one step forward and changed the rules, proceeding to approve unilaterally, by simple majority, a proposed constitution that they will eventually submit to a referendum.
Morales proceeded to nationalize the country's hydrocarbons, a decision that could have been for Bolivia's benefit, had it not been carried out in an improvised and hasty manner.
In the process, Morales alienated the country's partners and neighbours, its main clients and investors, and had no choice but to backtrack and renegotiate when faced with the realization of his government's incapacity to run the industry. The managerial and technical challenges, compounded with the capital and investment needs, and the planning and commercialization demands, proved insurmountable.
The damage was already done, as the credibility of the government was seriously impaired.
Bolivian foreign policy under Morales has been entirely dependent on the Havana-Caracas dictums. Innumerable opportunities for support and co-operation, attracting new investments, and cementing new partnerships for development have been botched by falling into the "anti-imperialist" rhetoric of Hugo Chavez.
The goodwill expressed by so many who wished to see Morales succeed has been dampened by unnecessary confrontational stances. Morales's handling of the 4th Europe-Latin America and the Caribbean Summit in Vienna, Austria, on May 2006, where he snubbed European co-operation in favour of radical posturing at a parallel summit, illustrates the point.
Be that as it may, it is in the domestic front where the combined policy failures and confrontational responses to dissent have had a more direct impact. Bolivia is in crisis. A country already divided along many lines has seen the divisions exacerbated by the current government. A deep and long expression of the country's regional imbalances, the autonomic aspiration of four departments (provinces) is now threatening with what the Organization of American States' envoy, Dante Caputo, warned could be a violence outbreak of unpredictable consequences.
On May 4, the Department of Santa Cruz is holding a referendum on autonomy. Three other departments plan to follow suit. It is no coincidence that these are the richer provinces, and strongholds of the opposition. The National Electoral Court (CNE) ruled that the referendums are illegal, ratifying a decision by Congress (taken in the absence of the opposition members who were locked out by Morales's supporters). Many mediation initiatives have failed thus far. The Church, Brazil, and the OAS have tried unsuccessfully to bring the government and the prefects (governors) of the four provinces to the negotiating table.
In a reversal of his initial position, the Bolivian foreign minister appealed to the OAS to mediate, and new attempts by the multilateral organization will take place this week, with the hope of reaching a compromise between the parties before the Sunday referendum.
The Permanent Council of the OAS, where the national governments of 34 countries of the hemisphere are represented, expressed last Saturday its support for the government of Bolivia, calling for the preservation of democracy and of the territorial integrity of the country.
A violent conflict in Bolivia would undoubtedly have repercussions throughout the region, and the biggest threats could come from an internationalization of the conflict through the intervention of Venezuela.
During an emergency presidential summit of the Bolivarian Alternative, ALBA, last week, Chavez warned that he would come in support of Morales. The opposition to Morales has forcibly denounced Venezuela's meddling in Bolivia's internal affairs. Military co-operation is but one of many joint initiatives that has included direct handouts of Venezuelan cheques to the ideologically akin municipal governments and "advisors" in all spheres of government.
Bolivia has shown great resilience in many difficult passages of its troubled history. Nobody would like to see the Andean nation plunge into a civil war that could tear it into pieces.
Yet, it should be the Bolivians, all Bolivians, who decide their fate. Let's hope it is through democratic and peaceful means, and that Morales understands that dissent is an essential component of democracy.
Although so many divisive issues imbue Bolivia's predicaments, and ethnicity is indeed one of them, Morales's undoing is thus far his own doing.
0 Comments